



KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

August 3, 2015

Ms. Aimee Alcorn
Assistant City Attorney
City of Corpus Christi
P.O. Box 9277
Corpus Christi, Texas 78469-9277

OR2015-15901

Dear Ms. Alcorn:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 573833 (City File No. 585).

The City of Corpus Christi (the "city") received a request for all documents related to a specified complaint. You claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.101 of the Government Code. We have considered the exception you claim and reviewed the submitted information.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Gov't Code § 552.101. This exception encompasses information other statutes make confidential. Section 2000e-5 of title 42 of the United States Code provides, in relevant part, the following:

Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved . . . alleging that an employer . . . has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC")] shall serve a notice of the charge . . . and shall make an investigation thereof . . . Charges shall not be made public by the [EEOC]. . . . If the [EEOC] determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the [EEOC] shall endeavor

to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be made public by the [EEOC], its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned. Any person who makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Under this provision, if the EEOC had processed the discrimination charge to which the information at issue pertains, the EEOC would be prohibited from releasing information about the charge that were made. However, you inform us the city's Human Relations Department (the "department") processed the charge on behalf of the EEOC. You assert the department acted as the EEOC's agent in processing this charge and is, therefore, subject to the confidentiality requirements of section 2000e-5(b).

You explain the EEOC is authorized by statute to utilize the services of state and local fair employment practices agencies to assist in meeting its statutory mandate to enforce laws prohibiting employment discrimination. *See id.* § 2000e-4(g)(1). You state the department is a local agency authorized by section 21.152 of the Labor Code to investigate complaints of employment discrimination. You also state the department has a "work sharing agreement" with the EEOC. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has acknowledged such a work sharing agreement creates a limited agency relationship between the parties. *See Griffin v. City of Dallas*, 26 F.3d 610, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding limited designation of agency in work sharing agreement is sufficient to allow filing with EEOC to satisfy filing requirements with former Texas Commission on Human Rights).

You state in rendering performance under the work sharing agreement, the department is supervised by the EEOC's contract monitor, and the tasks the department performs and the manner in which it performs them are limited by the terms of the agreement and by EEOC rules and regulations. Under these circumstances, we agree with your assertion that under accepted agency principles, the department acts as the EEOC's agent in processing charges on behalf of the EEOC. *See Johnson v. Owens*, 629 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("An essential element of proof of agency is that the alleged principal has both the right to assign the agent's task and to control the means and details of the process by which the agent will accomplish the task."). We also agree that as an agent of the EEOC, the department is bound by section 2000e-5(b) of title 42 of the United States Code and may not make public charges of discrimination that it handles on the EEOC's behalf. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); *see also McMillan v. Computer Translations Sys. & Support, Inc.*, 66 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, orig. proceeding) (under principles of agency and contract law, fact that principal is bound can serve to bind agent as well).

We note the requestor is the attorney of record for the respondent in the EEOC claim at issue. In *Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Associated Dry Goods Corporation*, 449 U.S. 590 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held the “public” to whom section 2000e-5(b) forbids disclosure of certain confidential information does not include the parties to the EEOC claim. *See* 449 U.S. at 598. Thus, the city may not withhold the submitted information from this requestor under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 2000e-5(b) of title 42 of the United States Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. The types of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court are delineated in *Industrial Foundation*. *Id.* at 683. Further, this office has concluded some kinds of personal financial information not relating to the financial transaction between an individual and a governmental body is generally highly intimate or embarrassing. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 600, 545 (1990) (deferred compensation information, participation in voluntary investment program, election of optional insurance coverage, mortgage payments, assets, bills, and credit history). This office has found financial information relating only to an individual ordinarily satisfies the first requirement of the test for common-law privacy. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 600 (designation of beneficiary of employee’s retirement benefits, direct deposit authorization, and forms allowing employee to allocate pretax compensation to group insurance, health care or dependent care), 523 (1989). Upon review, we find the information we have marked satisfies the standard articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation*. Accordingly, the city must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy.

Section 552.137 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “an e-mail address of a member of the public that is provided for the purpose of communicating electronically with a governmental body” unless the member of the public consents to its release or the e-mail address is of a type specifically excluded by subsection (c).¹ *See* Gov’t Code § 552.137(a)-(c). We find the e-mail addresses we have marked are not subject to subsection (c). Upon review, we find the city must withhold the e-mail addresses we have marked under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless their owners affirmatively consent to their public disclosure.


¹The Office of the Attorney General will raise a mandatory exception on behalf of a governmental body but ordinarily will not raise other exceptions. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 481 (1987), 480 (1987), 470 (1987).

In summary, the city must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy and the e-mail addresses we have marked under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless their owners affirmatively consent to their public disclosure. The city must release the remaining information.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Tim Neal
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

TN/sdk

Ref: ID# 573833

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)